2013) (explaining that non-sexual conduct will be based mostly on intercourse and subsequently contribute to a intercourse-based mostly hostile work atmosphere); Rosario v. Dep’t of the Army, 607 F.3d 241, 248 (1st Cir. Supreme Court’s holding in Bostock makes clear that a plaintiff could show that same-sex harassment relies on intercourse where the plaintiff was perceived as not conforming to conventional male stereotypes.”); Doe v. City of Det., 3 F.4th 294, 300 n.1 (6th Cir. 5 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2015) (holding that a reasonable jury may find that the plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work setting primarily based on race, nationwide origin, and ethnicity where the harassment included derogatory comments about conventional Cuban meals); Garcia v. Garland Indep. 2001) (holding that a reasonable jury may find that hostility directed toward an Orthodox Jewish school professor concerning her insistence that she not work in the course of the Sabbath constituted harassment based on religion); Ibraheem v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 29 F. Supp.

Corp., 216 F. Supp. Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 475 (fifth Cir. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140, 143-44 (5th Cir. 25 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 36 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. As was acknowledged by Mr. Justice Field, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 19 See, e.g., Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d at 316-18 (reversing abstract judgment for the employer where there was proof that a Muslim worker was subjected to persistent religious harassment, which included repeatedly referring to the worker as “Taliban” or “towel head,” challenging the employee’s allegiance to the United States, and stereotyping Muslims as terrorists). 18 See, e.g., Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 443-44 (5th Cir. 20 See, e.g., Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. IA4c; see also, e.g., Doe v. C.A.R.S. 23 See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. 32 See Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, 870 F.3d 1253, 1260 (eleventh Cir. Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 10 (July 15, 2015) (concluding as a matter of regulation that sexual orientation is inherently “a ‘sex-primarily based consideration,’” and that an allegation of discrimination primarily based on sexual orientation is essentially an allegation of intercourse discrimination below section 717 of Title VII).

28 See infra Example 35: Comparative Evidence Gives Rise to Inference that Harassment Is based on a Protected Characteristic (offering an example of facially intercourse-neutral offensive conduct motivated by sex, corresponding to bullying directed toward employees of one intercourse). 5-11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020) (affirming jury verdict concerning a hostile work setting based on religion where staff had been compelled to take part in “new age” religious actions at work against their wishes). 2010) (stating that conduct that doesn’t have sexual connotations can contribute to a intercourse-based mostly hostile work setting). 2 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 17, 2021) (finding that the plaintiff had acknowledged a claim for relief by alleging a hostile work setting primarily based on his heterosexual standing); Boney v. Tex. 6, 2019) (denying summary judgment to the employer on the plaintiff’s sexual harassment declare alleging that she was subjected to conduct that included feedback from the plaintiff’s supervisor who, upon studying she was pregnant, advised her “he was upset because he did not need anybody else to have her,” “made sexual hand gestures together with his smock in entrance of her and instructed her that she had ‘nice breasts’ that had been ‘a nice dimension for sucking,’” mentioned she had a “fine sexy ass,” touched her, whispered in her ear, touched/grazed her buttocks, and confirmed her photos of himself partially undressed).

2008) (reversing summary judgment for the employer on a religious harassment declare that included proof that the worker was harassed, in part, due to his religious headwear). 1988) (“Protecting an employee’s right to be free from pressured observance of the religion of his employer is at the guts of Title VII’s prohibition towards religious discrimination.”); see also Garcimonde-Fisher v. Area203 Mktg., LLC, 105 F. Supp. 29 This doc doesn’t analyze software of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act to harassment primarily based on an employee’s request for, or receipt of, an accommodation. When David’s poetry outs him in school, the bullies take their harassment and abuse to the subsequent level. 21 For an in depth discussion and additional examples of Title VII’s prohibition towards harassment because of religion, see section 12-III.B of EEOC’s Compliance Manual Section on Religious Discrimination. 2003) (noting that firing somebody for being an atheist violates Title VII’s prohibition against religious discrimination); Scott v. Montgomery Cnty.